Mediation of International Conflicts: A Rational Model by Lesley G Terris

Author:Lesley G Terris [Terris, Lesley G]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, Peace, Political Science, Political Freedom, General
ISBN: 9781315467764
Google: 3TIlDwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 33341330
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2016-12-08T00:00:00+00:00

The Road to Camp David – US Mediation Resumes

By 1978, the Geneva concept had failed to materialize, and direct negotiations also seemed unpromising. The deterioration in the Sadat–Begin relationship prompted Carter and his advisers to reassess their Middle East policy. The United States was concerned that prolonged stagnation of the diplomatic process would again lead a frustrated Sadat to resort to violence (Carter 1982:315–16; Maoz 2006).

Thus, Carter decided to abandon the relatively passive stance the Americans had adopted since Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem. He now considered, for the first time, the possibility of inviting both Sadat and Begin to Camp David to try to break the impasse.

President Carter met with Sadat in Washington on 3–4 February 1978, when he put forth his vision on how to achieve a settlement. Carter would seek to bring about a change in Begin’s position on Palestinian self-rule so that he would accept the idea of a five-year transitional regime, at the end of which the Palestinians would participate, along with Israel and Jordan, in working out a final settlement in conformity with Resolution 242. These changes would allow Sadat adequate political cover to proceed in stages toward a full peace treaty with Israel. Carter’s meetings with Begin in Washington in March were much less pleasant than his sessions with Sadat.101 Israel’s official position on US mediation was not particularly favorable as both Begin and Defense Minister Weizmann had apprehensions that Washington would side with Egypt. Begin blamed the breakdown of the direct negotiations on Sadat’s insistence on full withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian state as preconditions for further talks. Blunt in his criticism of Israel, Carter replied that the issue rather was Begin’s refusal to consider any withdrawal at all in the West Bank. He also noted that Sadat favored a Palestinian entity tied to Jordan and not a fully independent state.

After the two leaders’ visit to Washington, Assistant Secretary of State Alfred Atherton shuttled between Cairo and Jerusalem with side trips to Aman and Riyadh. Direct talks also continued, largely facilitated by the personal rapport forged between Sadat and Weizman. Proposals focusing on the West Bank and Gaza Strip were sent back and forth, with no significant progress.102 After another unproductive meeting in Leeds in July 1978, this time between Vance and the Israeli and Egyptian foreign ministers, Sadat sent a lengthy message to Carter expressing his disappointment and informing Carter that further meetings with the Israelis could not be justified. To stress his despair, Sadat also closed down the Israeli military mission in Cairo (Quandt 1986:201).

Carter had not succeeded in bringing Egypt and Israel any closer to an agreement. Curiously, the really important concessions – Israel’s readiness in principle to withdraw from the Sinai and Egypt’s readiness to recognize Israel even without an Israeli commitment to withdraw from all of the territories occupied in 1967 – had already been made. Such readiness on the part of both parties was reflective of the value they attached to reaching an agreement as opposed to continuing the conflict.

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